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Abstract 
  This paper explores the dynamic relationships between European Union (EU) wheat export restitution 
awards and price movements in the world wheat market from November 20, 1986 through April 24, 1998. 
This study pairs the results of weekly EU open market tenders and corresponding foreign wheat export prices 
in a series of bivariate non-structural. From these models a feedback measure is calculated which estimates 
the contribution of innovations in wheat prices to the variance in export tenders and vice versa. Feedback was 
decomposed into patterns—short-term and long-term—that approximate patterns of strategic behavior or 
political strategy. The study showed overall feedback and short-term innovations in wheat export prices and 
European restitution awards are relatively small. As the length of the feedback decomposition increases 
directional feedback diverges. The importance of export price changes to European restitution awards 
increases in long-run relationships. In contrast weekly EU restitution awards decrease in their importance to 
wheat export price changes as decomposition periods increase. The general pattern found in the study seem 
to indicate that world export prices contribute substantially to long-term variations in EU open market tender 
awards, while these awards appear to have negligible effects on long-term international wheat price 
determination. Short-run and long-run feedback results provide evidence in support of an international wheat 
market that is minimally influenced by the administration of EU export subsidies. The long-term conduct of 
European wheat export policy appears to have been influenced to some degree by the international wheat 
market.  
Introduction 
  European wheat export subsidies have drawn the attention of the world’s other major exporters. 
Trade theory and traditional models predict the effect these subsidies should have in a world wheat 
market. However, the world wheat market exhibits properties that violate many of the assumptions 
applied in traditional trade models. Of particular interest is the participation of governmental and quasi-
governmental institutions that possess market power in the world wheat trade, including the European 
Commission (Carter et al., 1990).  Substantial portions of European export subsidies are administered 
through an open market tender process rather than as standing refunds. The European Commission’s 
Cereal Management Committee (CMC) convenes weekly—Christmas and Easter weeks excepted—to 
determine the quantity of exports to be subsidized and the value of the refunds per metric ton. As they 
evaluate wheat export tenders the CMC has the opportunity to reflect upon world market conditions 
and to consider the consequences of their own actions on world prices. Because the EU is a large wheat 
exporter, the European Commission has the capacity to administer export subsidies in a strategic 
fashion. Evidence of European strategic behavior in the world wheat market would carry implications 
for modeling and evaluating the effects of European wheat subsidies.  
  The purpose of this study is to investigate the effects of EU export refunds awarded through 
open market tenders in the world wheat market. The period under investigation begins shortly after the 
initiation of the US Export Enhancement Program (EEP) and ends as major exporters begin 
compliance with the Uruguay round of WTO agreements (1986-1998).  This study will examine  
European wheat export subsidies in the context of a dynamic relationship between policy 
implementation and international wheat prices. Feedback between prices and EU exports are 
decomposed into long-term and short-term relationships. A better understanding of a dynamic 
relationship between EU export subsidies and international wheat prices would benefit the 
development of several models and interpretations of international wheat. 
Background 
  Policy modeling exercises involving commodities such as wheat usually work with the assumption 
that international agricultural markets are perfectly competitive, observation and evidence would 
suggest otherwise. Governmental and quasi-governmental institutions invested with marketing power 
by large wheat exporting nations are awkward realities (Carter et al., 1990; McCalla et al., 1981; and 
Ackerman and Dixit, 1999).  Trade models based on imperfect competition are less comfortable 
vehicles for policy analysis since small differences in behavioral assumptions can produce varying and 
conflicting policy prescriptions (Sarris, 1981 and McCalla & Josling, 1981). Furthermore, the behavior 
and practices of large state trading enterprises (STE) are often shrouded in secrecy, offering little in the 
way of data that could be used to analyze their behavior (Ackerman and Dixit, 1999). 
  In models of the international wheat market, European export restitutions are usually represented 
as a wedge between the world price and domestic European target price. This representation is drawn 
directly from theoretical and observational properties of the European agricultural policy. Under the 
CAP, wheat and other grains are subject to a variable levy system that “automatically” adjusts border 
prices in response to world price movements. The levy provides trade researchers two important 
ingredients for wheat export models. First, since the levy system is designed and implemented to isolate 
domestic European wheat market from the vagaries of world price movements, price transmission 
from the international market into the European economy is assumed to be zero. Secondly, the price 
differential (wedge) maintained by the levy system offers a convenient representation for European 
export subsidies.  
   European variable levies were implemented when the EU was a net wheat-importing region, so 
the variable levy for wheat functions as a variable tariff. Granted, now that the EU exports wheat into 
the world market the price differential supported by the levy must be closely linked to European 
subsidies. However the levy is not technically a subsidy. European wheat export subsidies are awarded 
through a bidding process that allows the European Commission’s Cereal Management Committee  
(EC-CMC) to manage export price and quantity of exports over the course of time. The active role of 
the EC-CMC in overseeing wheat exports has been the subject of few research efforts (Becker, 1991; 
Burgeon and Le Roux, 1996a; Burgeon and Le Roux, 1996b). If the EC-CMC awards restitutions in 
response to—or anticipation of—world price changes, or if they account for the effects of their own 
actions in the international market, European export subsidies may not qualify as an exogenous variable 
in trade models. 
  The weekly pattern of choices by the Cereals Management Committee may contain revealing 
information about the administration of EU wheat subsidies and the world’s major wheat exporters. 
Weekly export tender results are a rare short-period, time-series policy instrument providing an 
opportunity to explore the relationship between its implementation and the behavior of world wheat 
prices. 
Approach 
  Measurement of linear dependence between economic variables provides an estimation of the 
relative predictive importance between these sets of variables over time. The non-structural VAR 
approach used in this study employs feedback measurements developed by Geweke (1982) and 
McGarvey (1985). These methods are comparatively unconstrained allowing for complex interactions 
such as those that are likely to exist between wheat export prices and European export policy. In 
contrast to non-causality tests proposed by Granger (1969) and Sims (1980) feedback analysis does not 
test point hypotheses.  Rather, bias adjusted feedback is measured between two variables—export price 
and European export restitutions. The comparison of these linear feedback measures and the 
corresponding proportion of prediction error explained may reveal patterns in the international wheat 
market.  Evidence of patterned feedback may be useful for building and refining more structured 
models of the international wheat market and the role that European export subsidies play in world 
wheat price determination. 
  The study addresses three main questions. 1) Is there evidence of a dynamic relationship between 
the administration of EU wheat export restitutions and wheat export prices of other exporting 
countries? 2) Do EU wheat export subsidies function as exogenous shocks to international wheat 
markets or does the administration of restitutions through open market tenders convey evidence of 
strategic trade? 3) Should feedback relationships exist, are they consistent with recognizable patterns of 
industrial and/or political adjustment?     
 Using  methods  developed  by McGarvey (1985), feedback relationships between variables can be 
decomposed into frequency bands that correspond to familiar seasonal, industrial and political rhythms. 
Directional feedback is decomposed by time intervals to test for short, medium and long run 
relationships between export prices and EU wheat export refunds. Time intervals chosen a priori for 
examination in this study are short-term (less-than-one-month and one-to-five-months), production 
response (6 to 18 months), political (1.5 to 5 years) and long-term (beyond five years). During the short-
term period, governments and firms (including wheat producers) would be very limited in their capacity 
to adapt or respond to the effects of weekly EU subsidies. The length of the production season period 
would correspond to planting decisions by producers and allow government agencies to respond within 
the context of policy available to them. The political period roughly contains the length of the US Farm 
Bill, the period between EU CAP adjustments and elections cycles in many of the developed countries. 
Long-term effects would include “permanent” adjustments in the dynamic relationship between wheat 
export prices and EU wheat export restitutions. 
  Feedback responses derived from these price/policy regressions are not dependent upon market 
structure. Peculiarities such as wheat class and quality variations, large exporting countries and 
governmental agencies invested with market power should not detract from the results of this study. 
Price/policy relationships can be studied independently of the actual market structure of the wheat 
trade. Market imperfections may also result from political economy interactions and national strategic 
trading policies (McCalla et al., 1981; Carter et al. 1990).  The dynamic role of policy implementation in 
wheat price formation—European open market tenders in particular—has not received much attention. 
Empirical Analysis 
Data 
  The data sets used for this analysis include weekly wheat price data of four major international 
exporters and published European weekly wheat export restitutions awarded through open market 
tenders encompassing the period November 20, 1986 through April 24, 1998. The price series are 
constructed from two sources. Through June of 1991, price series are taken from a report prepared 
for the Wheat Export Trade Education Committee (Goodwin and Smith, 1995). The remainder of 
the price series was obtained from the International Grains Council’s Grain Market Report of 
London. All prices are f.o.b. in $US per metric ton. Wheat prices include Trigo pan (Argentina),  
Australian Standard White and #1 Canadian Western Red 13.5% wheat.  US wheat prices are for 
hard red wheat, Gulf.  
  The data series for European export restitutions was gathered from weekly issues Agra-Europe. 
The publication reports the results of the regular meetings of the European Commission’s Cereals 
Management Committee including information on open market tenders for wheat export 
restitutions. The data series representing the volume of the export subsidy is metric tons of common 
wheat made eligible weekly through successful tenders to the EC-CMC. 
Table 1: Stationarity tests for weekly data series. 
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  The lag period used for the regressions in this study was determined by weighing the tradeoffs 
between optimal and ideal values. Optimal lag length was estimated using Akaike and Schwarz test  
in RATS (Estima, 1995). Pairing European policy instruments with wheat export prices, the optimal 
lag length was found to fall within the range of 18 to 22 weeks for all planned regressions. There is 
also the matter of an ideal lag length that must be considered comparing results between different 
time periods when decomposing variance by frequency. Geweke(1982) notes that when feedback 
values for different time periods  ( 0) λ p x f →   and  () 1 λ p x f →  are both of interest, the optimal lag length 
should be at least  1 0 λ λ π − 2 . Under these circumstances, the collection of weekly data series is 
well suited to comparisons over periods of a few weeks, but to determine differences over longer 
periods of time—which are also of interest—the ideal lag period would be in excess of 100.    
  This set of data series is long enough to support 100+ lags, however the results of the Akaike 
and Schwarz tests would tend to indicate that longer lags may prove to be so variable as to preclude 
their usefulness. The regressions used in this study were run for lag periods of 25, 50, 75, and 100. 
After 50 lags, confidence intervals for feedback measures became excessively high while the 
differences between 25 and 50 lags were very small. To strike a balance between the optimal and 
ideal lag length, a value of 50 was chosen. 
  Each price and export series was tested for stationarity using the augmented Dickey Fuller test 
and the KPSS test.  All of the export price series and the series for export subsidy value exhibit 
evidence of non-stationarity.  The subsidy volume series for open market tenders produce 
conflicting test results (Table 1). The null hypothesis for the DF unit root test is that there is a unit 
root.  The null hypothesis for the KPSS test is that there is not a unit root.  Since the KPSS test 
statistic strongly suggests that the weekly volume of open market tenders is a stationary series, the 
variable EXRV will be treated as a stationary series, paired with the differenced export prices from 
each of the four export price series. 
Measuring Linear Feedback 
  The degree of linear dependence between wheat export price changes (p) and European export 
restitution awards (x) is measured using methodology developed by Geweke (1982). Linear 
dependence in a bivariate system is defined in terms of the following projections, where p and x are 
linearly indeterministic stationary processes.  
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Unconditional feedback between x and p is derived from the error terms in equations (1) through (3) 
as follows: 
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  The first ratio ( ) is the directional feedback from x to p. Feedback from p to x (F ) can 
be calculated by switching x and p in equations (1) and (3).  The measure  is zero if and only if 
x fails to Granger cause p (this would be equivalent to the condition a  for all s ). 
p x F → x p→
p x F →
0 = () 2 s
  Total linear dependence between x and p,  is defined as follows,   p x F ,
, F + F   + F    =   F p     x x     p p     x p    , x • → →  
where  is the measure of contemporaneous feedback between x and p.  p x F •
  Each feedback measure is transformed by calculating, 1 . The transformation is the 
reduction in one-step-ahead linear prediction error variance of p due to x, given past p (or x due to p, 
given past x, when the variables are switched in equations (1) and (3)). 
( F − − exp ) 
  McGarvey (1985) extends Geweke’s method of measuring feedback to the moving average 
form of the system. Like Geweke’s measure, McGarvey’s can be decomposed by frequency 
allowing interactions to have both short and long term effects. For the purpose of illustrating 
McGarvey (1985) feedback the vector z is used to maintain consistency of notation. Let 
be a 2 ×  1 vector of jointly wide-sense stationary, linearly indeterministic processes with the 
following autoregressive representation: 



















where  is serially uncorrelated with mean zero and a covariance matrix Ω.   t w
 The  series  z must be transformed in such a way that the concurrent errors are uncorrelated so 
that the effects of orthogonal innovations can be attributed to only one element of  . A Choleski 
transformation is used to restrict the contemporaneous coefficient matrix on  to be lower 




  The moving average (MA) representation of (4) is obtained by inverting the transformed VAR 
system. The MA representation of  in terms of the orthogonalized innovations 
is as follows, 
( ′ = t t t x p , z
( ′ = t t t u e , η
() (5) t t L η G z =  
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  Overall feedback from export restitution shocks, u , to wheat export price changes is defined as 
follows 
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  As with Geweke feedback the transformation  ( ) ( ) p u F → − − exp 1  represents that proportion of p’s 
variance due to shocks from x.  In a bivariate system, McGarvey and Geweke feedback measures 
are equivalent. 
  McGarvey and Geweke feedback can be decomposed by frequency, separating longer-run 
effects from those that may be more transient. The European Commission’s Cereals Management 
Committee (EU-CMC) weekly export tender decisions may affect—or be affected by—short-term 
export price movements. Perhaps the administration of export subsidies tracks or leads pricing 
patterns that may be periods of several months or even years. Higher feedback measure would be 
expected in the higher frequency bands if export restitution awards were tied primarily to short-term 
adjustment in wheat export prices.  The overall feedback measure can also be used to test lower 
frequency bands representing longer-term interaction. 
 The  spectral  density  of  p in the bivariate system can be written as: 
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  Using the spectral density matrix  () λ p S , overall frequency feedback results can be decomposed 
by frequency interval () 2 1,λ λ  as follows: 
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 The  transformation  of the feedback result  () ( ) 2 1, 1 λ λ p u f → −  would represent the fraction of p ’s 
variance related to cycles of periods  2 2 λ π to  1 2 λ π (weeks) as a result of innovations in x. 
  To illustrate, suppose  represents weekly wheat export price changes (p) and  is the 
weekly volume of wheat export restitutions (x) awarded by the EC-CMC. Let the frequency 
band
t i, z t j, z
( 2 1, ) λ λ  be equivalent to four-week periods. Equation (9) would then represent the proportion  
of the variance in export price changes  (p) due to cycles of one-month periods that is due to 



















Regressions and Tests 
  Using the software program RATS (Estima, 1995) the following autoregressive system was 
estimated by OLS. 
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Let  K be an upper triangular matrix such that 
1 - Ω K K = ′ . Using   and  () L B ˆ K the following 
orthogonalized system was used to construct the feedback estimators. 
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At each of 520 frequencies, a Fourier transformation of   was evaluated to construct    () L B ˆ () λ B ˆ
() π π λ 2 , , 260 , 0 K = . The inverse of this matrix was calculated at each frequency producing the 
estimator of the cross-spectral density matrix of z, S , where  .  () () ′ = λ λ G ˆ ˆ () λ G ˆ () ()
1 ˆ ˆ − = K B G λ λ
1 −
  The linear feedback estimator of European export restitutions (x) to wheat export price (p) over 
frequency band  [ 2 1, ] λ λ θ = is calculated as follows 
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where   and   are the (1, 1) and (1, 2) elements of the 2 x 2 matrices  and  . 
Total feedback from x to p is estimated by using 
() λ p S ˆ () λ 12 ˆ G () λ z S ˆ () λ G ˆ
[] π θ 2 , 0 = . Conversely feedback from p to x 
would be estimated from the same set regressions and transformations using the following test 
statistic 
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For this statistic   would be the (2, 2) element of S  and G  would be the (2, 1) 
element of G . These test statistics were estimated for each national wheat export price in 
combination with the weekly volume of wheat export restitutions approved for export by the EC-
CMC. 
() λ x S ˆ
)
() λ z ˆ () λ 21 ˆ
( λ ˆ
  In addition to total feedback estimations, test statistics were calculated for time periods that may 
reflect economic or political patterned responses.  The periods chosen include innovations that 
occurred within less than a month  [] π π θ 2 , 130 33 = , within one to five months 
[ 260 131 , 130 11 ] π π θ = , from six to eighteen months  [ 260 21 , 130 3 ] π π θ = , two to five years 
[ 260 5 , 130 1 ] π π θ =  and infinite feedback  [ 0 , 0 = ] θ .  Notice how the  “width” of the frequency 
bands representing longer time periods becomes narrower as the time period of interest gets longer. 
So much so that many long term effects may overlap and be difficult to separate, especially with 
only 50 lags in the autoregressive model. As mentioned earlier, the trade-off with more lag periods 
would inflate the variability of the estimates that would make confidence intervals for the feedback 
measures very large for all frequency bands. 
Bias Correction and Confidence Intervals 
 
  Bias corrections and confidence interval estimation are based on methods described by Cushing 
and McGarvey(1990). For the unconditional estimators of the feedback measures, the 50-lag 
autoregressive model used to estimate the test statistic was run using each country’s export wheat 
price paired with open market export tender data. The beta coefficients and variance results for the  
population estimates from each autoregression were calculated over the weekly data series 
encompassing 20-November-1986 through 24-April-1998  .  () 578 = T
  Using Monte Carlo techniques in RATS (Estima, 1995), 200 sets of simulated data were 
constructed using the first 50 actual observations in weekly data series and estimated values using 
the estimated parameters from the test regressions for the remaining variables represented by 
 where  .   () t t L e z B = ˆ () Ω e ˆ , 0 ~ N t
  Each set of the 200 simulations generated an expected value for the feedback estimator for the 
model( ), a value for the tenth centile (L) and the ninetieth centile (U). Note that 
 serves as the basis for a confidence interval surrounding the population 
feedback measure.  
() f E
( <U f ) 8 . 0 = < L P
 Now  let  F be the population feedback measure and define the following variables:  () f E L = l , 
() f E U u = and,  () f E F a = , 
() () () 8 . 0 = < < f uE f f E P l  or    () () () 8 . 0 = < < f auE af f E a P l
where af is an unbiased, or bias adjusted estimator of F. 
  From the Monte Carlo experiments the parameters  , and  were calculated by averaging 




() f E L ,  () f E U and () f E F , from the  different autoregressive pairings 
between price and exports.  For each type of feedback measure, the estimated 80% confidence 
interval published with the bias adjusted feedback measure is 
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where   is the feedback point estimate for a particular pairing of price and exports.   o f
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This procedure ensures that the bias adjusted estimated feedback  falls within the estimated 
confidence interval. The number of sampling distributions estimated for each autoregressive pair of 
data in this study include: Geweke contemporaneous, k = 1; Geweke directional k = 2; Geweke 
linear dependence, k =1; and McGarvey frequency decompositions and overall feedback, k = 6. 
( o
i
o f a )
Results 
Overall Feedback 
  The first column of numbers in Table 2 represents the directional feed back measure between 
variables. The right-most column includes the transformation  ( ) p x F → − exp 1 , the corresponding 
proportional reduction in predictive error variance between volume of wheat export refunds and 




Proportion of Prediction  
Error Variance Explained 
EXRV USA F →   .0467 .0456  (.0203  ,  .0868) 
USA EXRV F →   .0285 .0281  (.0124  ,  .0540) 
EXRV USA F •   .0017 .0017  (.0008  ,  .0033) 
EXRV USA F ,   .0764 .0736  (.0339  ,  .1338) 
EXRV ARG F →   .0323 .0318  (.0140  ,  .0608) 
ARG EXRV F →   .0309 .0305  (.0135  ,  .0584) 
EXRV ARG F •   .0027 .0027  (.0012  ,  .0052) 
EXRV ARG F ,   .0654 .0633  (.0291  ,  .1157) 
EXRV AUS F →   .0341 .0336  (.0148  ,  .0642) 
AUS EXRV F →   .0511 .0498  (.0221  ,  .0945) 
EXRV AUS F •   .0030 .0030  (.0013  ,  .0057) 
EXRV AUS F ,   .0875 .0838  (.0387  ,  .1517) 
EXRV CAN F →   .0416 .0407  (.0180  ,  .0776) 
CAN EXRV F →   .0316 .0311  (.0137  ,  .0595) 
EXRV CAN F •   .0005 .0005  (.0002  ,  .0010) 
EXRV CAN F ,   .0731 .0705  (.0324  ,  .1283) 
 
Table 2. Geweke Measure of Linear Dependence Between Weekly Wheat Export Price Changes and the Volume of European  
Export Restitutions Awarded through Open Market TendersBased on a 50-Lag, Bivariate Autoregressions, 20-Nov-1986 to 24-
Apr-1998. Predicted Error Variance Transformations include 80% Confidence Interval. 
 
  Over the 11½-year period the linear dependence between export price changes and European 
open market tender awards are similar for all four countries. For example, slightly more than seven 
percent (1 ) of the variance in US wheat export prices and the volume EU 
tender awards can be attributed to innovations in the other series. The connection between EU 
tender awards and wheat export price changes in the other three regions was correspondingly 
similar: Argentina 6.3 percent; Canada 7.0 percent; and Australia 8.4 percent. Confidence intervals 
suggest world wheat export prices and EU open market tender awards account for as little as 3 
percent (US) or as much as 15 percent (Australia) of the total predicted error variance between 
wheat export prices and the EU subsidy.  
() 0736 . exp = − → USA EXRV F
  For all four major wheat exporters, the magnitude of the total feedback relationship is similar 
for the respective directional feedback estimates. The largest divergence is found in the relationship 
between US and Australian wheat export price movements and EU tender awards where the 
proportion of predictive variance from prices to restitution awards differs by only 1.7 percentage 
points (US: .0456 - .0281 = .0174, AUS: .0511-.0341=.170). The 80 percent confidence intervals 
for predictive variance reduction do not draw a distinction between overall direction of feedback 
either from prices to subsidies or from subsidies to prices. What can confidently be said of the price-
export feedback relationship is that contemporaneous variation between tender awards and each of 
export price series is negligible and clearly less than predictive variance from any of the directional 
feedback interactions. The contemporaneous feedback between EU restitution awards and wheat 
export price changes are near or under 0.3 percent in each country (  = .0017). The 
contemporaneous relationship between Canadian wheat prices and EU restitution awards is smaller 
than for corresponding interactions in Australian and Argentina with 80 percent confidence; 
however, with all values less than one percent this appears to be an unimportant result. 
EXRV USA F •
  The absence of a contemporaneous relationship is consistent with the conduct of the open 
market tender process or any policy instrument for that matter. It is difficult to imagine a scenario in 
which EU-CMC tender award decisions could vary simultaneously with movements in world wheat 
prices. Economic explanations could account for explanatory variance originating from either of 
these series. European tender awards could lead price changes if the subsidy approvals elicited  
shocks in world wheat prices. Conversely, international wheat price movements could factor into 
EU-CMC tender award decisions and a corresponding variance reduction would be expected from 
the opposite direction.  Although several times larger than contemporaneous feedback directional 
results are not at all large 
  Consider possible influences on international wheat prices over a span of 11½ years including, 
but not limited to, the effects of weather, global economic performance and political interventions. 
One could argue that the six to eight percent reduction of prediction error variance between past 
weekly wheat export price movements and past EU weekly wheat subsidy awards indicates the 
relationship between EU subsidies and international wheat prices is an important one.  The smaller, 
individual directional feedback estimate from export prices to restitution awards and those from the 
awards back to prices are more problematic, explaining less than 5 percent of the predictive error 
variance from either variable to the other. The smaller numbers could more easily be dismissed as 
unimportant if there were no a priori reason to suspect feedback between these variables. 
International tensions surrounding European wheat export restitutions and the importance of the 
weekly process for awarding them support the a priori suspicions that there is some feedback.  
Based on these observations and the results in Table 2, there is slight evidence of feedback over 
time between wheat export prices and EU open market, but the magnitude of the overall feedback 
was relatively small compared to other factors involved in wheat export price formation. 
  Geweke overall feedback estimates in both directions were very similar for each set of export 
prices. The absence of a distinction between the relationship involving changes in different 
countries’ wheat export prices and EU restitution awards is not unexpected. The long period 
encompassed by the study and the tendency of international wheat prices to move together over 
time make it difficult to isolate country specific effects of EU restitution awards.  
Feedback Decomposition 
  Geweke and McGarvey total feedback measures are equivalent in bivariate autoregressive 
systems. Overall feedback relationships as estimated by the McGarvey method can be decomposed 
into long-term and short-term patterns. For example, the EU uses export prices of the US and 
Argentina as a guideline for setting standing restitutions. A short-term feedback relationship may 
exist between these price series and EU open market tender awards that might be masked in the  
long run.  From the other direction, exporters that sell wheat most closely matching European 
exports in class and quality could experience greater short-run shocks to prices as a result of EU 
tender awards. The results of McGarvey feedback and decomposition of variance by time period are 
listed in Tables 3a and 3b. For each of the four exporting regions, two directional feedback 
estimates are listed for each time period. Column-wise transversals of the result in Table 3 provide a 
country-by-country look at the predictive variance relationships between wheat export prices and 
European open market tender awards for each time period. A row-wise transversal to the results in 
Table 3 (treating 3a & 3b as a single table) offer a time-period by time-period look at the 
relationships between each exporting nation and EU restitution awards. 
  Proportion of Prediction Error Variance Explained (80% Confidence Interval)  




Country  United States  Argentina 


























































Table 3a. McGarvey Feedback Between Weekly Wheat Export Price Changes and European Export 
Restitutions Awarded Though Weekly Open Market Tenders. Estimates are Bias Adjusted Proportion of 
Variance Reduction Estimates with 80% Confidence Intervals. Based on a 50 Lag Autoregression, 20-Nov-
1986 to 24-Apr-1998. 
  The overall reduction in the proportion of predictive variance calculated using McGarvey 
feedback is equivalent to the overall feedback estimated using Geweke feedback. The similarities 
between overall predictive variance estimation in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate this relationship. 
Since McGarvey and Geweke overall feedback are theoretically equivalent, differences in the 
estimated values between procedures can be attributed to precision during the calculation process. 
The calculation of McGarvey feedback requires several data transformations including numerous 
matrix operations, real-to-imaginary series conversions and Fourier transformation of the beta  
coefficients. The two feedback methods yield very similar results. The only point estimates that 
draw attention are for Argentina where Geweke estimations of predictive variance explained are 
very close to the same for feedback in each direction, (ARG→ EXRV=.0323 and 
EXRV→ ARG=.0309) while the McGarvey counterparts differ slightly more (ARG→ EXRV = 
.0412 and EXRV→ ARG = .0274). Even so, 80 percent confidence intervals show that a distinction 
cannot be made between these overall values for either McGarvey or Geweke feedback.  
  Proportion of Prediction Error Variance Explained (80% Confidence Interval) 
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Table 3b. McGarvey Feedback Between Weekly Wheat Export Price Changes and European Export Restitutions 
Awarded Though Weekly Open Market Tenders. Estimates are Bias Adjusted Proportion of Variance Reduction 
Estimates with 80% Confidence Intervals. Based on a 50 Lag Autoregression, 20-Nov-1986 to 24-Apr-1998. 
  Overall variance is decomposed into five different time periods. Time-period specific values for 
proportional predictive variance in Table 3 are that portion of the overall relationship that varies in a 
pattern that matches the time period length. Feedback for these decompositions can exceed overall 
feedback. Shocks that vary in their persistence (frequencies) or coincide with shocks that originate 
from the opposite direction of the feedback relationship can dampen or hide each other. Infinite 
feedback is that proportion of variance attributable to past innovations in the companion variable 
where the time pattern is infinite in length—permanent effects. The two-to-five-year feedback 
period is a pattern that approximates the periodic responses of political or industrial changes. The 
European CAP and US Farm Bill revision would fit under this pattern, as would election cycles and 
moderately long-term adjustment in the wheat industry. The six-to-eighteen-month period is of a  
length that could include seasonal adjustment in planting or storage by wheat producers. Six-to-
eighteen-months would also include short-term government policy responses. One-to-five-months is 
a less immediate response to price movements or restitution awards. One important relationship that 
fits within this period is the requirement that European export firms use EU open market tender 
awards within six months. The shortest period listed is less-than-one-month in length.  Short period 
feedback would include very immediate responses between the variance of wheat export price 
movements and EU restitution awards. 
 The  feedback  decompositions  of the relationship between US wheat export price changes and 
EU open market tender awards indicate that there are directional feedback differences. The 
magnitude of feedback is proportionally much greater in the direction of US export prices to open 
market tender awards than it is for the European restitutions to US wheat export price changes. The 
proportion of predictive variance explained is higher during each time period from prices to 
subsidies. The difference appears more so for the longer time periods than for the short-run 
segments. Nearly 22 percent of the variance corresponding to permanent effects in the volume of 
EU open market tender could be attributed to innovations in US wheat export prices. Conversely, 
just under two percent of the variance in US wheat export prices could be credited to the volume of 
European wheat export restitutions awarded through open market tenders. A very similar and 
seemingly one-sided association between price and subsidy is also evident for the political-
industrial pattern of 2 to 5 years. In the three decompositions representing time periods of less than 
2 years, predicted error variance proportions were less than 6 percent with estimates being higher 
from US export prices to EU restitutions. Eighty-percent confidence intervals indicate that infinite 
feedback from US price to EU restitution volume is more important than for any other portion of the 
decomposed variance in either direction. For the other US price to export decompositions, feedback 
patterns approximating two-to-five-year patterns cannot be considered different from the six-to-
eighteen-month and one-to-five-month patterns.  However, two-to-five-year shocks appear to 
produce greater effects than feedback patterns of less-than-one-month. The confidence intervals fail 
to distinguish between any of the feedback effects for different time periods in the direction of EU 
open market tender awards to US wheat export prices. According to these results, the administration 
of European subsidies accounts for a relatively small proportion of the weekly variance in US wheat 
export prices.  
  Wheat export price feedback patterns for the remaining three countries generally follow the 
same pattern as that exhibited by US export price changes. The similarities extend to both the 
magnitude and direction of the feedback decompositions. For Argentina, the largest feedback 
relationships between wheat export price changes and EU restitution awards was in the direction of 
prices to subsidies over the long term. For shocks with permanent effects, variations in Argentine 
wheat export prices accounted for 14 percent of the predicted error variance in EU restitution 
awards. The same directional feedback accounted for nearly 17 percent of the variance in two-to-
five-year patterns. The point estimates of directional feedback from Argentine prices were lower at 
other frequencies, however 80 percent confidence intervals indicate that the two-to-five-year 
feedback from Argentine prices to EU subsidies is greater than one-to-five-month and less than one-
month patterns. Infinite feedback from Argentine price changes to EU subsidies is greater than the 
less-than-one-month relationship. Six-to-eighteen-month patterns of feedback are indistinguishable 
from the other decompositions.  
  Administration of the European open market tenders is proportionally much less important to 
Argentine export price movements. Predictive error variance in Argentina wheat export prices 
explained by EU restitution awards is less than three percent for each of the time period 
decompositions. The feedback relationships from Argentine price to EU subsidy are 
indistinguishable from each other based on the 80 percent confidence interval estimates. For the two 
shortest periods the feedback relationship is similar in each direction. Between three and four 
percent, the short-term feedback relationship between Argentine prices and EU restitution awards 
closely resembles the overall feedback estimates. 
  The analysis of Australian wheat export prices and EU export restitutions produced some of the 
most distinct results between time periods. For infinite shocks, innovations in Australian wheat 
export prices account for approximately a quarter (.2617) of the predicted variance explained for 
EU restitutions in the bivariate system. Confidence intervals indicate that infinite feedback from 
Australian prices to EU restitutions is larger than feedback decompositions for all of the other time 
periods in either direction. The two-to-five-year pattern (.1836) is larger than all other 
decompositions with two exceptions: one-to-five-months and six-to-eighteen-month patterns in the 
direction of EU restitutions to Australian wheat prices. As was also the case with Argentina,  
feedback estimates involving Australian wheat for infinite and two-to-five-year decompositions are 
much larger in the direction of price to EU restitutions. 
  Not only are long term feedback estimates for EU restitutions to Australian wheat export prices 
smaller than feedback in the opposite direction for comparable time periods; infinite feedback from 
EU wheat subsidies to Australian export prices is smaller than feedback in the same direction than 
the three shortest periods. Similarly, feedback from subsidies to prices for periods of two-to-five-
years is smaller than the one-to-five-month decomposition. Predicted variance reduction for 
Australian wheat export prices due to innovations in EU restitutions was 5 percent or slightly less 
for the decomposition of variance in patterns of 6-18 months, 1-5 months and less-than-one-month. 
At 80 percent confidence, the shortest three periods of decomposition were indistinguishable from 
each other in either of the directional feedback estimates involving EU restitutions and Australian 
wheat export prices. 
  The Canadian wheat export price relationship with European wheat export restitutions closely 
mimics that of the Australia’s. The proportion of variance in European restitutions accounted for by 
innovations in Canadian wheat prices is larger for infinite and two-to-five-year decompositions than 
for six-to-eighteen-month and one-to-five-month periods (.1638 and .1456 vs. .0339 and .0343). 
The variance reduction in Canadian wheat prices attributed to shocks in EU restitutions could be 
considered negligible for both the infinite (.0007) and one to five year (.0024) decompositions. The 
preponderance of directional feedback in periods greater than two years seems clearly to be greater 
from Canadian prices to EU restitutions than from restitutions to prices. Even though the proportion 
of variance reduction in Canadian wheat export prices due to innovations in EU wheat subsidies is 
relatively small for variance decompositions less than two years in length (~2.5-3.5 percent), the 
infinite and one-to-five-year patterns are even smaller than these modest levels. 
  Country-by-country analysis indicates that EU restitutions have a relatively small effect on 
wheat export prices of major wheat exporting nations. The modest effect seems even less important 
to long run export price changes. World wheat prices tend to have a greater impact on the volume of 
EU restitutions awarded through the weekly open market tender system.   
  Now considered row-by-row comparing the different regional export prices by time period 
(rows spanning Tables 3a and 3b). Feedback from EU wheat export restitutions to wheat export 
prices is far less than feedback in the direction of prices to subsidies. Point estimates for infinite 
effects of the proportional variance explained in EU restitutions by export price changes range from 
14 percent (Argentina) to 26 percent (Australia). Export price to subsidy feedback is equivalent for 
all countries according to 80 percent confidence bands. The permanent effects of EU restitution 
awards on export price changes are only one tenth that of the corresponding feedback from price 
changes to subsidies. The proportional reduction in Canadian price changes due to variance in EU 
export subsidies was very near zero (.07 percent) and is less than that measured for US (1.7 
percent), Argentina (1.5 percent) and Australia (0.8 percent). EU restitution awards do not seem to 
have had permanent effects on wheat export prices. International wheat price movements do appear 
to have contributed substantially to long-term patterns of EU open market tender awards. 
  The two-to-five-year period roughly approximating political cycles and industry adjustments 
shows very nearly the same pattern and magnitude of feedback found for permanent effects. The 80 
percent confidence intervals for export prices to EU restitutions are all very nearly the same with 
estimates of variance reduction ranging from 14.5 percent (Canada) to 18.5 percent (United States). 
Feedback from EU wheat subsidies to wheat export prices is again on the order of one-tenth that of 
the countervailing feedback. At less than 2 percent--except for Canadian price feedback which is 
even less than that of other export prices—EU export restitutions have accounted for little of the 
variance in wheat export price changes in two-to-five-year patterns. In contrast, major exporter 
wheat prices have accounted for a considerable amount of the variation in EU export tender awards 
in the two-to-five-year pattern. 
  For the six-to-eighteen-month period, fewer differences are found in the magnitude of feedback 
in either direction. Although larger variance reductions can generally be attributed to feedback from 
wheat export price to EU restitutions (USA excepted: 4.5 percent vs. 4.8 percent) the measures are 
mostly indistinguishable from one another based on 80 percent confidence intervals. One difference 
between two countries does occur in feedback from EU subsidies to export price.  Within 80 percent 
confidence, the feedback from EU wheat export subsidies to Australian export prices is greater than 
the feedback for the EU restitutions to Argentina export prices. It can also be said that the feedback 
from any of the major exporters’ wheat prices to EU restitutions is larger than feedback from EU  
restitutions to Argentine export price. Canadian and US feedback, based on the confidence intervals 
cannot be distinguished from either Argentina or Australian price feedback measured in the 
direction of subsidy to price. As the time period in question shortens and grows closer to the time of 
the EU weekly tender award, the magnitude of the effect of price begins to diminish. As for 
feedback of EU subsidies to price, it is difficult to say in general, but feedback may be increasing 
slightly for Canada and Australia. This cannot be said with certainty. Class and quality of Argentine 
and Australian wheat are more similar to EU wheat exports than Canadian or US wheat exports 
used in this study. It seems odd that they would exhibit different magnitudes of response to EU 
export restitutions. The differences could be due more to political and economic policies than wheat 
type. 
  Now consider the 80 percent confidence intervals for the bivariate feedback measurements that 
match the patterns of less-than-one-month and one-to-five-months respectively. All point estimates 
of feedback in both directions for these two periods are under six percent but greater than two 
percent. Distinctions between any of these estimates cannot be made using the 80 percent 
confidence intervals. The short-term interrelationship between European export restitutions and 
world export prices seems to be on the order of importance as overall feedback relationships.  The 
proportional variance reductions in the one-to-five-month and less-than-one-month frequency bands 
seem to indicate that recent world export prices have little if any role in determining the volume and 
timing of EU open market tender awards. By the same token, since EU open market tender awards 
must be executed in less than six months, it would appear that the timing of export subsidies from 
the European Union have a small immediate effect on world export prices. 
Conclusion 
. Overall feedback between export prices and the volume of European Union subsidy awards 
appears to be a relatively small factor in the formation of international wheat prices. When 
decomposed by time period some differences begin to emerge. Short-term innovations in wheat 
export prices and European restitution awards are relatively small. As the length of the feedback 
decomposition increases directional feedback diverges. The importance of export price changes to 
European restitution awards increases in long-run relationships. In contrast weekly EU restitution 
awards decrease in their importance to wheat export price changes as decomposition periods 
increase in length. Differences in feedback due to country of origin are few and possibly could be  
attributed to unique features of export policy or similarity to European exports. These findings are 
less remarkable than the general conclusion that world export prices contribute substantially to 
long-term variations in EU open market tender awards, while these awards appear to have 
negligible effects on long-term international wheat price determination. 
  By using time-series policy variables, this study provides supporting evidence that European 
wheat export subsidies for wheat can be considered an exogenous variable for the purposes of 
modeling the international wheat market. Though the European Commission would appear on the 
surface to be able to manage the timing and volume of exports to its advantage, in the international 
marketplace there is no evidence that such strategy is employed. Short-run and long-run feedback 
results provide evidence in support of an international wheat market that is minimally influenced by 
the administration of EU export subsidies. European wheat export policy appears to have been 
influenced to some degree by the international wheat market. Economic theory tells us that export 
subsidies by large exporting countries distort the market. The results from this study do not 
contradict theory. Rather, the study indicates that from Europe’s example even though government 
policies distort markets, the implementation of the policy does not allow them to manipulate 
international wheat markets to their advantage. 
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